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Abstract  
Using the data collected by a survey of small-scale fishing households from rural coastal communities 
in Indonesia, we examine the underlying factors that may potentially be associated with the incidence 
of conflicts among local marine resource users. Intra-village and inter-village conflicts are examined 
separately. We find that social relationships and individual perceptions of changes in fishery 
conditions are significantly associated with the incidence of both intra- and inter-village conflicts. We 
confirm that declining fish stocks is positively associated with inter-village conflicts but not with 
intra-village conflicts; while increasing catch is positively associated with intra-village conflicts but 
not with intra-village conflicts. 
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1 Introduction 
 Literature on civil conflicts around the world has been widely available for a long time, with recent 
studies including Blattman and Miguel (2010), Collier and Howffler (2004), Collier (2009), and North, 
Wallis, and Weingast (2009). Common causes of civil conflicts, among others, include an unequal 
distribution of political power and economic welfare among different socio-economic groups, a 
division between ethnic or religious groups, and weak state capacity to prevent and resolve conflicts. 
Like most nations worldwide, Indonesia has in the past experienced a number of civil conflicts, which 
resulted in direct cost of lives, livelihoods and infrastructure throughout the country, and some 
districts, particularly rural areas, are more prone to violent conflict (Barron, Kaiser, & Pradhan, 2009). 
Literature on civil conflicts in Indonesia has been available since at least 1950 (van der Kroef, 1950) 
and studies so far have focused on conflicts related to military-backed attacks destroying movements 
opposed to the central government (Anderson & McVey, 1971; Aspinall, 2007).  
 
A few years after the fall of Soeharto in 1998, there were sparks of communal conflict that were not 
initiated by a military attack in Indonesia. For example, the United Nations Support Facility for 
Indonesian Recovery (UNSFIR) recorded that the number of communal conflicts more than tripled 
from 1997 to 1999, although the number of conflict-related deaths and incidents has declined since 
this period (Varshney, Panggabean, & Tadjoeddin, 2004). These post Soeharto non-military conflicts 
have also triggered the development of a new literature on communal conflicts in Indonesia (Tajima, 
2014; van Klinken, 2007). Most Indonesian conflict literature, however, has focused on large-scale or 
headline conflicts and, to date, relatively few studies have examined small-scale or local conflicts. 
Although local conflicts do not make headlines, they are often violent, causing destruction of 
livelihoods as well as serious injury and often resulting in death. What is even more limited in this 
literature is a quantitative case study based on a household survey designed to understand the patterns, 
causes and impacts of non-headline local conflicts. While two recent quantitative studies by 
Tadjoeddin and Murshed (2007) and Barron, et al. (2009) focus on violent local conflicts in Indonesia, 
these studies are based on high level data; that is, either district-level data retrieved from the UNSFIR 
database or village-level data drawn from the Village Potential Statistics (PODES). Variation in the 
types, sources and impacts of local conflicts does exist such that, while cross-district and cross-village 
analysis have been able to build up links to the theory of conflict, a quantitative analysis based on 
household-level data is crucial to deepening our knowledge of local conflicts (Blattman & Miguel, 
2010).   
 
In this paper, we use household-level data to empirically explore the pattern of local conflicts among 
individual marine resource users in small-scale fishing villages in Indonesia. We undertook a 
household survey of 296 households from fishing villages in the Kei islands, which are situated in 
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southeast Maluku of Indonesia. Previous field studies identify that the small-scale fishing households 
in the region are prone to local conflicts because of religious, ethnic and kinship segregation as well 
as because of poverty, socioeconomic inequality, and the decline in natural resources (Adhuri, 2013; 
Girsang, 2011; Thorburn, 2000). Using the household survey data, we apply a binary regression 
model to explore the underlying factors that may potentially be associated with the probability of 
individual fishers being involved in a conflict with other local marine resource users.  
 
In the last two decades, there has been a growing body of literature exploring the nexus between civil 
conflicts and natural resources (Homer-Dixon, 1994; Nillesen & Bulte, 2014; Ross, 2004). It is 
important to improve our understanding of the patterns of local conflicts across coastal regions in 
Indonesia and the link between their occurrence and different aspects of small-scale fisheries as well 
as changes in the natural and social environment within which the artisanal fishing activities are 
undertaken. Indonesia is the world’s largest archipelago nation with over 13,000 islands and has the 
sixth largest exclusive economic zone. By the early 2010s Indonesia had become the second largest 
marine capture fisheries producer after China (FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Department, 2014). A 
distinctive characteristic of Indonesia’s marine capture fisheries is that, unlike other large developed 
fishing nations, small- scale fisheries account for a large share of production. For example, only 25 
percent of the fishing vessels operating in Indonesia in 2012 were equipped with inboard motors, and 
more than 70 percent of these vessels were less than 5GT (DGCF, 2013). While the contribution of 
fish production to Indonesia’s total GDP is relatively small (< 2 percent in 2007), it creates significant 
employment opportunities in the vast coastal areas and provides the government with an important 
source of foreign exchange. Fish also accounts for more than 50 percent of animal protein intake and, 
in particular, rural coastal communities, such as those in eastern Indonesia, rely heavily on marine 
resources for their livelihood (World Fish Center, 2011). The sustainable use of local marine 
resources therefore plays a crucial role in improving the food security and alleviating poverty among 
rural coastal communities (Béné, Macfadyen, & Allison, 2007).  
 
Despite the small scale of individual fishing operators, there is growing concern about the ecosystem 
impacts of fishing and the health of marine resources in Indonesian waters. Major causes for concern, 
among other things, include the increasing number of both legal and illegal domestic fishers as well as 
fleets from foreign countries, and the increasing access to more modern fishing equipment 
(Resosudarmo, Napitupulu, & Campbell, 2009; Williams, 2007).1 The economic wellbeing of small-
scale fishing households in Indonesia is sensitive to changes in the near coastal environment as they 
operate within the areas around the villages, or 12 miles from the shore, given their limited capacity to 
                                                     
1 Other causes include population growth, poverty and increased demand for fish, pollution from both land- and 
sea-based activities, and lack of public awareness and scientific knowledge (Heazle & Butcher, 2007; Novaczek, 
Sopacua, & Harkes, 2001). 
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travel long distances (Adhuri, 2013; Adhuri & Visser, 2007; Pomeroy et al., 2007; Satria & Matsuda, 
2004). The degradation of local fishing grounds not only affects the livelihood of coastal communities, 
but may also increase competition and create conflict among local resource users for the fewer 
resources available for exploitation (Bennett et al., 2001). Conflict among local marine resource users 
is not a problem unique  to Indonesia, and has long been recognised and documented worldwide as a 
problem affecting the wellbeing of coastal communities (Bailey et al. 1986; Yamamoto 1995; Masalu 
2000; Bennett et al. 2001; Salayo et al. 2006). Resolving local resource conflicts in developing coastal 
states is important to improve the productivity of small-scale fisheries and to build the environment 
for the government to formulate effective management plans. Moreover, when a conflict occurs, it not 
only creates significant monetary losses for the communities involved but sometimes leads to 
incidents that result in the death of community members (KIARA, 2012). 
 
There are a number of qualitative studies that focus on individual incidents of conflict over the use of 
marine resources and explore the causes and impacts of resource conflicts in Indonesia and other 
countries (Olomola 1998; Thorburn 2000; Bennett et al. 2001; DuBois and Zografos 2012; Adhuri 
2013). However, quantitative research is underdeveloped with regard to which individual marine 
resource users are more prone to be involved in local conflict and what attributes of marine resource 
users are systematically associated with its incidence. In particular, only a limited number of studies 
have used a relatively large sample of household-level data to explore the underlying factors that may 
affect the incidence of local resource conflicts. The aim of this paper is to fill this gap and enrich 
literature on case studies of local conflicts over the use of marine resources. Among the limited 
literature, two exceptions are Pomeroy et al. (2007) and Muawanah et al. (2012) who conducted 
household surveys in fishing communities to explore whether the level of marine resource conflict is 
reduced by the existence of co-management arrangements in Southeast Asian countries, including 
Indonesia.   
 
We distinguish different types of local conflict with respect to whether a conflict occurs between 
marine resources users within the same village (intra-village conflicts) or from different villages 
(inter-village conflicts). Salayo et al. (2006) reviewed fishery-related conflicts in South and Southeast 
Asia and found that each fishery conflict can involve various groups in the local community. In our 
study, the distinction between the intra- and inter-village conflicts is important because small-scale 
fishers in rural coastal communities in Indonesia generally have a close working relationship with 
other fishers in the same village. In other words, the way in which individuals interact with other 
fishery resource users in the same village is different from how they interact with outsiders. The 
factors and the extent to which each factor is associated with the incidence of inter- and intra-village 
conflicts could be structurally different and, hence, each type of local conflict needs to be examined 
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separately. To date, however, there has been no study that has assessed the potential factors associated 
with the incidence of intra- and inter-village conflicts separately. 
 
2 Methods 
2.1 Research site 
Data were collected in the Kei Islands, which are situated in southeast Maluku, Indonesia. The Kei 
islands form an archipelago of four main islands (Kei Kecil, Kei Besar, Kur and Dullah) plus 
hundreds of small mostly uninhabited islands, covering 1,384 km2 of land and 21,916 km2 of sea. 
According to the Office of Population and Civil Registration, the total population of the Kei islands, 
which comprise the Tual city and Southeast Maluku regency, was approximately 189,628 in 2012 
(BPS, 2014a, 2014b) and has slowly but consistently increased over time (Adhuri, 2013). The people 
of the Kei islands come from diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds and live in a multicultural 
environment.  
 
The main source of livelihood in the Kei islands is agriculture, and the main commodities include 
cassava (enbal in local language) as the staple food, coconut, and nutmeg. Another considerable 
source of livelihood for the small island communities are the marine capture fishery and other marine 
based small-scale industries, such as seaweed and pearl cultivation. The Kei islands are also the centre 
of cultural and marine tourism in the Maluku province as Kei society maintains many cultural 
traditions and tropical coral reefs are found around the islands. Fishing activities undertaken by local 
community members in the Kei islands are artisanal, such that the majority of boats do not have 
inboard motors, and the common fishing equipment used by local fishers includes lift-nets (bagan), 
drift gill-nets (jaring insang hanyut), troll lines (pancing tonda), vertical lines (jaring insang tegak), 
hand lines (pancing ulur), bottom gill nets (jaring insang tetap), encircling gill nets (jaring insang 
lingkar),   small-purse seine nets (pukat cincin), and fish traps (bubu).  
 
2.2. Survey  
Face-to-face interviews were conducted in the Kei Islands from November to December 2013. The 
survey covered four fishing villages in the district of Kei Kecil and 296 households which were 
randomly selected and surveyed with a structured questionnaire. For each household, the survey 
targeted the main fisher who spends the most time involved in fishing activity in the household. Prior 
to the implementation of the survey, we visited the surveyed villages and pre-tested the survey 
instrument. The interviews were undertaken by local researchers at the University of Pattimura, all of 
whom attended training and information sessions.  
 
2.3 Econometric methods 
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Our aim was to assess the factors that are potentially associated with the incidence of conflicts among 
marine resource users.  To achieve this, we estimate the conditional probability that a respondent is 
involved in a conflict with other resource users, such that:  
 
   (1) 
 
where  is a binary variable and k = I and O. For example,  equals one if respondent i indicated 
that he/she has a conflict with other resource users in the village, and equals zero otherwise. Similarly, 
 equals one if respondent i has a conflict outside the village and equals zero otherwise. In the 
survey, the questions concerning local conflicts were worded as follows: 
 
“Do you have ongoing or past conflicts with other marine resource users in the village? (Yes/ No)” 
“Do you have ongoing or past conflicts with other marine resource users in other villages? (Yes/ No)” 
 
We therefore focus on conflict that occurs in local coastal communities among marine resource users, 
regardless of whether it is violent.2 
 
On the right hand side of equation (1), F is a cumulative distribution function taking values between 
zero and one, and hence the conditional probability on the left hand side of the equation is also 
bounded between zero and one. We include a matrix of explanatory variables ( ), each of which is 
grouped into one of the five categories according to their attributes, namely: fishing activity (FA); 
fishery condition (FC); social relationship (SR); threats to local fishing activity (TF); and 
demographic characteristics (DMO). The parameter β0 is the intercept and βFA, βFC, βSR, βTE, and βDMO 
are vectors of the corresponding coefficients of the explanatory variables. It is important to note that 
most explanatory variables included in equation (1) are likely to be endogenous as the occurrence of 
conflict among local marine resource users affects various aspects of the fishing activity as well as 
how each fisher perceives changes in the fishing environment and social relationship in the 
community. That is to say, the estimated coefficients of the explanatory variables in (1) imply a level 
of association, rather than causal relationship, with the incidence of local conflicts. 
 
                                                     
2 A typology of different types of fishery conflicts was developed by Charles (1992) and revised by Bennett et 
al.( 2001). Type of conflicts considered in this paper can be classified as a conjunction of Types III and IV in 
Bennett et al (2001). 
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We determine the extent to which each explanatory variable included in equation (1) affects the 
probability of intra- and inter-village conflict by calculating the marginal effect of changes in an 
explanatory variable for respondent i (MEi). For continuous explanatory variables, the marginal effect 
of explanatory variable xij for respondent i is calculated as: 
 
      (2) 
 
where βj is the coefficient of variable xij. Similarly, for binary explanatory variables, the marginal 
effect is calculated as: 
 
     (3) 
 
Given the marginal effect for respondent i, we can calculate the sample average of the marginal effect 
as  (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005).  
 
To estimate the coefficients in equation (1), we adopt both the probit and logit models, in which the 
logistic model is specified as  and the probit model is 
specified as   where f  is the standard normal density. The two different 
binary regression models are estimated to assess the robustness of our estimations results against the 
model specifications. We cluster standard errors by village to control for potential correlation between 
the respondents in the same village. 
 
3 Results 
3.1 Characteristics of surveyed villages 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the dependent and explanatory variables in each group of 
the five categories. The dependent variable in equation (1) has a binary outcome indicating whether 
the respondent has a conflict with other marine resource users. In our sample, the proportion of the 
respondents who indicated that there was a conflict with other resource users in their village is 8.6 
percent and outside the village is greater at 28 precent.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
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The small-scale fishery in the Kei islands is a multi-species fishery, in which the respondents in our 
sample caught a total of 23 species in the year 2012/2013. The most common species include small 
tuna (komu), coral cod (kerapu), mackerel (kawalinya), scad (momar), bluefin trevally (bubara), 
ornate emperor (sikuda), and anchovy (puri).  The total volume of fish caught for each fishing trip 
varies significantly among the fishing operators. The mean and median catch per trip is 1.486 and 
0.310 tonnes, respectively. The great dispersion between the mean and median values indicates a 
positively skewed distribution of total catch per fishing trip. Fish is an important animal protein in the 
diet and a major source of income in the surveyed villages, and fishing is generally undertaken 
throughout the year. On average, the respondents are engaged in fishing for six days a week. Around 
46 percent of the respondents indicated that they recently changed their main fishing grounds and 
nearly 75 percent of the respondents indicated that their main fishing grounds are outside the village’s 
sea territory.3 In the surveyed villages, fishing equipment is often shared within a group or borrowed 
from other village members. Around half the fishing equipment used in 2012/2013 was not owned by 
the fishing operators.    
 
Although our respondents are located within a relatively small geographical area and engaged in a 
similar type of fishing activity, individual fishers have different perceptions of fishery conditions. 
More than 50 percent of the respondents indicated that the fish stocks in their fishing grounds are 
decreasing and their catch has declined over time. However, despite the fact that half of the 
respondents perceived that fishery conditions are declining, around 19 percent of the respondents still 
reported that their catch and fish stocks in the fishing grounds are increasing. Regarding an 
individual’s social relationships, most respondents maintain a good relationship with the village leader 
(kepala desa), whereas about 35 percent of the respondents indicated that they do not have a good 
relationship with officers at the district fishery department. In Indonesian waters, there is an 
increasing number of vessels from outside that are harvesting marine resources both legally and 
illegally and they are considered to be a potential threat to the health of aquatic ecosystems (Adhuri & 
Visser, 2007; Resosudarmo et al., 2009). In our sample, around 50 percent of the respondents 
observed outsiders fishing in their village sea territory at least once a week.  
 
In our survey, the respondents were also asked to indicate whether the potential threats, namely 
population growth, deforestation of mangroves, aquaculture development, and tourism development, 
negatively affect their fishing activities. Around 50 percent of the respondents agreed that population 
growth and aquaculture development are the two biggest threats. The two least threatening factors are 
the deforestation of mangroves and tourism development with a 39 and 17 percent agreement rate, 
respectively.  
                                                     
3 The concept of the sea territory in the Kei islands is discussed by Adhuri (2013).  
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The average age of the respondents is 38 years old and all except three respondents are male. The 
average years of formal school education are 8.5 years and more than 90 percent of the respondents 
completed 5 to 6 years of primary education. Given that we targeted the survey at villages where the 
main source of livelihood is fishing, all respondents’ main occupation is fishing; yet about 75 percent 
of the respondents also indicated that they have a second job, such as farming crops, cultivating 
seaweed, raising livestock, and being involved in business services.  
 
3.2 Intra-village conflicts 
Table 2 reports the estimation results of equation (1) for the case of intra-village conflicts where a 
conflict occurs between marine resource users within the same village. The estimation results of the 
probit and logit models are almost identical, in terms of both the marginal effects as well as the 
statistical significance, and we interpret the estimation results using the probit model. While the value 
of the persudo-R2 is 0.209, the likelihood ratio test (LR = 35.6, d.f. = 22) suggests that the explanatory 
variables are jointly significant at the 5 percent level and more than 90 percent of the observed 
dependent variable is correctly predicted by the model. These statistics suggest that the model fits the 
data relatively well for a binary regression model. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Our estimation results show that whether a fisher has a conflict with other marine resource users in the 
village is related to all variables concerning fishery conditions (FC) and social relationships (SR) at 
the statistically significant level (p < 0.05). Notably, among all explanatory variables included, 
whether fishers maintain a good relationship with the village leader has the largest marginal effect on 
the occurrence of intra-village conflicts. More specifically, our estimation results suggest that fishers 
who have a good relationship with the village leader are on average 13.4 percent less likely to be 
involved in intra-village conflicts than those who do not. Similarly, fishers who have a good 
relationship with officers at the district fishery department have a lesser likelihood of being involved 
in intra-village conflicts than other fishers do.  
 
Our estimation results also show that the incidence of resource conflicts within a village is associated 
with the individual’s perception of changes in fishery conditions. For example, fishers who perceive 
that the fish stocks in their fishing grounds are depleting are less likely to be involved in a conflict 
with other resource users in the village. This may reflect the fact that fishers with the perception of 
declining fish stocks are more likely to cooperate with one another within the village to cope with the 
environmental degradation. By contrast, fishers who indicated that their catch has increased are 4.7 
percent more likely to be involved in intra-village conflicts. Resource conflict within a village is also 
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more likely to occur among local marine resource users who often observe that outsiders have access 
to the village sea territory and catch fish. 
   
In contrast to the variables concerning social relationships and fishery conditions, the probability of 
whether a fisher becomes involved in a conflict within the village is not associated with most 
variables related to fishing activity (FA). The statistically insignificant variables of the fishing activity 
include the catch per trip, number of fishing days per week, the cost per fishing trip, and fishing 
location. The two variables that do have a statistically significant relationship (p < 0.10) with the 
occurrence of intra-village conflicts are the number of years the fisher has been fishing in the same 
village sea territory and the proportion of the fishing equipment owned by the fisher. More 
specifically, the longer the fisher has been catching fish in the village sea territory, the less likely he is 
to have a conflict with other marine resource users in the village. Furthermore, the greater the 
proportion of the fishing equipment owned by the fisher, the less likely it is that a resource conflict 
within a village will occur.  
 
Among the four variables of threats to local fishing activity (TF), population growth and tourism 
development is associated with a higher level of resource conflicts within a village (p < 0.05). For 
instance, fishers who indicated that population growth negatively affects their fishing activity are 9.5 
percent more likely to be involved in a conflict with other resource users in the village. Given limited 
alternative livelihoods, as observed in other reef fisheries (Joshua E Cinner et al., 2009), population 
growth may threaten the health of marine resources and increase resource competition among 
resource users, especially with new participants. The development of local conflicts due to population 
pressure has long been recognised (Myers, 1987) and has also been reported in other Indonesian 
fishing communities (Muawanah et al., 2012). It is however important to note that not all external 
threats to the local fishing activity contribute to the incidence of intra-village conflicts. For example, 
fishers who perceive that tourism development negatively affects their fishing activity are less likely 
to be involved in intra-village conflicts. As opposed to population growth, tourism development may 
yield an opportunity to earn a secondary source of income and may decrease fishery resource conflicts.    
  
3.3 Inter-village conflicts 
Table 3 reports the estimation results of equation (1) for the case of resource conflicts between 
different villages. The estimation results of the probit and logit models are again similar to each other, 
and we base the interpretation of our estimation results on the probit model. The likelihood ratio test 
(LR = 74.2, d.f. = 22) suggests that the explanatory variables are jointly significant at the 1 percent 
level of significance. Nevertheless, the pseudo-R2 and the prediction success rate are lower than those 
for the case of intra-village conflicts in Table 2.   
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[Table 3 about here] 
  
A major difference between the results for the case of intra- and inter-village conflicts is that all 
variables concerning fishing activity (FA) have a statistically significant effect on the occurrence of 
resource conflicts between different villages. Notably, fishers whose main fishing area is outside their 
village sea territory are 20.6 percent more likely to be involved in a conflict with other marine 
resource users outside their village. Furthermore, fishers who have recently changed the location of 
their main fishing area are 14.6 percent more likely to have inter-village conflicts. Another fishing 
activity variable, which has a relatively large marginal effect (p < 0.05), is the proportion of fishing 
equipment owned by the fisher. Similarly to our results for the intra-village conflict, an increase in the 
private ownership of fishing equipment is associated with a lesser probability of inter-village conflicts. 
For the other fishing activity variables, we find that, albeit the marginal effects are relatively small, a 
fisher is more likely to be involved in a conflict with other resource users outside the village if the 
catch per trip is smaller, the number of days engaged in fishing per week is greater, the cost per trip is 
greater, and the number of years fishing in the village sea territory is longer.  
 
Similarly to the case of intra-village conflicts, the difference in individuals’ perceptions of changes in 
fishery conditions is also associated with the incidence of inter-village conflicts. Interestingly, 
however, the coefficients of these variables have an opposite sign from those in the case of intra-
village conflicts. For instance, fishers who perceive that the fish stocks in their fishing grounds are 
decreasing are more likely to be involved in a conflict outside the village. Moreover, fishers who 
indicated that their catch has increased are less likely to be involved in a conflict with other marine 
resource users outside their village. Similarly, the variables concerning social relationships with the 
village leader and district fishery department officers have different results from the case of intra-
village conflicts. For instance, in contrast to the case of intra-village conflicts, fishers who have a 
good relationship with the village leader are 15.4 percent more likely to have a conflict with other 
resource users outside the village. Furthermore, we find no evidence that having a good relationship 
with officers at the district fishery department is associated with a lesser probability of inter-village 
conflicts. These results may reflect the limited capacity of local institutions or the current co-
management arrangements in our study site to lessen the conflict between different villages. Previous 
studies also reported mixed outcomes of co-management arrangements and cases in which the local or 
centralised management authority struggled to resolve conflicts over resource use in the Kei islands 
and elsewhere (Adhuri, 2013; Bennett et al., 2001; Cinner et al., 2012; DuBois & Zografos, 2012; 
Siry, 2011). It is likely that a good working relationship between resource managers and resource 
users is crucial for successful conflict management; yet not sufficient by itself to alleviate all resource 
conflicts.   
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Regarding the variables concerning the threats to local fishing activity (TF), only the deforestation of 
mangroves is related to the occurrence of inter-village conflicts at a statistically significant level, 
despite the signs of the coefficients being the same as those for the case of intra-village conflict. 
Fishers who indicated that the deforestation of mangroves negatively affects their fishing activity are 
on average 11.1 percent more likely to be involved in a conflict with resource users from outside the 
village. Conversely, we find no evidence that the incidence of inter-village conflicts is related to other 
threats, including population growth, aquaculture development, and tourism development. 
Furthermore, while we did not find that a minority ethnic group is more or less likely to be involved 
in intra-village conflicts than other major ethnic groups, our estimation results for the inter-village 
conflict suggest that a minority group is less likely to be involved in a conflict with other marine 
resource users outside the village.  
 
4 Concluding remarks 
In this paper, we undertook a survey of small-scale fishing households in the Kei islands of southeast 
Maluku in Indonesia, and conducted a regression analysis with the collected data to examine the 
underlying factors that may potentially be associated with the incidence of local resource conflicts. 
We distinguish conflicts arising within the same village (i.e., intra-village conflicts) and conflicts 
involving resource users from different villages (i.e., inter-village conflicts).  Local conflicts over the 
use of natural resources can negatively affect the productivity of small-scale fisheries, inhibit the 
social, economic, and conservation outcomes of fisheries management and threaten livelihoods of the 
rural coastal communities. It is thus important from both the development and resource management 
perspective to improve our understanding of the patterns of local conflicts in coastal communities and 
the link between conflicts and different aspects of small-scale fisheries. This paper also aims to enrich 
literature on understanding determinants of non-headline local conflicts as there is limited quantitative 
case studies based on household survey data (Barron et al., 2009). 
 
We consider a number of potential factors associated with the incidence of resource conflicts in local 
coastal communities, each of which is grouped in one of five categories according to their attributes, 
namely fishing activity, fishery conditions, social relationships, threat to local fishing activity, and 
demographic characteristics. We find that the set of factors associated with the incidence of intra-
village conflicts is different from that of inter-village conflicts. For instance, individuals’ choice of 
fishing location is associated with conflicts between resource users from different villages, but it does 
not affect the incidence of resource conflicts within the same village. Similarly, other variables 
concerning fishing activity, such as the volume of catch and cost per fishing trip are significantly 
associated with the incidence of inter-village conflicts but not with intra-village conflicts. An 
exception is the variable concerning the private ownership of fishing equipment. Our regression 
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results show that an increase in the proportion of fishing equipment owned by a fisher is associated 
with a lesser probability of both intra- and inter-village conflicts. This result is aligned with previous 
research, such that the private or community-based ownership of harvesting rights plays a crucial role 
in determining the outcome of the fishery as well as the development of local fishery conflicts 
(Adhuri, 2013; Grafton et al., 2006). Our result extends this result, suggesting that increases in the 
private ownership of fishing equipment may help to decrease the incidence of local conflicts among 
marine resource users. 
 
Our results further show that, while some of the factors are associated with both intra- and inter-
village conflicts, the way in which these factors affects each type of local conflict is different. For 
instance, fishers who have a good relationship with district fishery department officers are less likely 
to be involved in a conflict in their village. Contrary to this, however, we find no evidence that fishers 
who have a good relationship with the department officers are less likely to be involved in a conflict 
with other resource users from outside their villages. Furthermore, improving a relationship between 
fishing operators and their village leader by itself may create a trap for coastal communities, by 
discouraging intra-village conflict while at the same time intensifying inter-village conflict. While 
social capital, including connections among individuals within a local community, plays a crucial role 
in the socio-economic performance of fisheries management (Pomeroy & Berkes, 1997), our results 
suggest that how social relationships work in resolving local conflicts depends on who is involved in 
the conflict and other characteristics of conflicts that emerge in coastal communities.  
 
We also find that individuals’ perception of changes in fishery conditions affects the incidence of 
intra- and inter-village conflicts differently. For instance, fishers are less likely to be involved in intra-
village conflict if they perceive that the fish stocks in their fishing grounds are decreasing over time. 
By contrast, the likelihood of resource conflicts between different villages increases with the 
perception of declining fish stocks. Similarly, fishers who indicated that their catch has increased are 
more likely to be involved in a conflict outside their village, but at the same time, they are less likely 
to be involved in a conflict within the village. These results suggest that the perception of declining 
fish stocks may contribute to the development of conflicts between different villages, particularly 
when the depletion of fish stocks is perceived as a result of the increase in catch by other fishers and 
this perception of one party gaining at the expense of another party can trigger resource conflicts 
between resource user groups. However, the perception of declining resources available for 
exploitation may not always increase competition among resource users, particularly when they are in 
a cooperative relationship within the same village. This is most likely the case with the small-scale 
fishing villages in our study site as most fishers indicated that they have a good relationship with other 
fishers in their village and fishing equipment is often shared by a group or borrowed from other 
village members.  
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It is well accepted that marine ecosystems in Indonesian waters are under increasing pressure from 
human activities and many fish stocks are either fully or over-exploited. In relation to this, there is a 
growing concern for overinvesting in fishing capacity to compete with other marine resource users as 
well as for the development of local conflicts over the use of natural resources. While preventing 
emerging and resolving existing conflict is important, our results overall show that there is no single 
factor or category of the attributes predominantly related to the incidence of local conflicts in the rural 
coastal communities in the Kei islands; conversely, different sets of factors jointly explain the 
variation in local conflicts. Our results further reinforce observations that resource conflicts involve 
various resource user groups in the local community and the way in which the socio-economic 
characteristics of the community members relates to each type of conflicts is complicated.  
 
 
  
17 
 
References 
Adhuri, D. S. (2013). Selling the Sea, Fishing for Power: A Study of Conflict over Marine Tenure in 
Kei Islands, Eastern Indonesia (p. 224). Canberra: ANU E Press. 
Adhuri, D., & Visser, L. (2007). Fishing in Fishing Out: Transboundary Issues and the 
Territorialization of Blue Space. Asia Pacific Forum, 36, 112–145.  
Anderson, B. R., & McVey, R. T. (1971). A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965, Coup in 
Indonesia (p. 162). Ithaca, NY: Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University. 
Aspinall, E. (2007). The construction of grievance natural resources and identity in a separatist 
conflict. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 51, 950–972.  
Bailey, C., Cycon, D., & Morris, M. (1986). Fisheries development in the Third World: the role of 
international agencies. World Development, 14, 1269–1275.  
Barron, P., Kaiser, K., & Pradhan, M. (2009). Understanding Variations in Local Conflict: Evidence 
and Implications from Indonesia. World Development, 37(3), 698–713.  
Béné, C., Macfadyen, G., & Allison, E. H. (2007). Increasing the contribution of small scale fisheries 
to poverty alleviation and food security (p. 125). Rome: Food and Agricultural Organization of 
the United Nations.  
Bennett, E., Neiland, A., Anang, E., Bannerman, P., Atiq Rahman, a., Huq, S., … Clerveaux, W. 
(2001). Towards a better understanding of conflict management in tropical fisheries: evidence 
from Ghana, Bangladesh and the Caribbean. Marine Policy, 25(5), 365–376.  
Blattman, C., & Miguel, E. (2010). Civil War. Journal of Economic Literature, 48(1), 3–57. 
BPS. (2014a). Maluku Tenggara in Figures (p. 344). Southeast Maluku Regency (Badan Pusat 
Statistik Kabupaten Maluku Tenggara): Central Board of Statistic. 
BPS. (2014b). Tual in Figures (p. 320). Southeast Maluku Regency (Badan Pusat Statistik Kabupaten 
Maluku Tenggara): Central Board of Statistic. 
Cameron, A., & Trivedi, P. (2005). Microeconometrics: Methods and Applications (p. 1034). New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
Charles, A. (1992). Fishery conflicts: a unified framework. Marine Policy, 16, 379–393. 
Cinner, J. E., McClanahan, T. R., Daw, T. M., Graham, N. a J., Maina, J., Wilson, S. K., & Hughes, T. 
P. (2009). Linking social and ecological systems to sustain coral reef fisheries. Current Biology : 
CB, 19(3), 206–12.  
Cinner, J. E., McClanahan, T. R., MacNeil, M. a., Graham, N. a. J., Daw, T. M., Mukminin, a., … 
Kuange, J. (2012). Comanagement of coral reef social-ecological systems. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences, 109(14), 5219–5222.  
Collier, P. (2009). Wars, Guns and Votes (p. 272). London: Bodley Head. 
18 
 
Collier, P., & Howffler, A. (2004). Greed and grievance in civil war. Oxford Economic Papers, 56, 
563–595.  
DGCF. (2013). Capture Fisheries Statistics of Indonesia 2007-2012 (p. 135). Jakarta: Directorate 
General of Capture Fisheries, Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries. 
DuBois, C., & Zografos, C. (2012). Conflicts at sea between artisanal and industrial fishers: Inter-
sectoral interactions and dispute resolution in Senegal. Marine Policy, 36(6), 1211–1220.  
FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Department. (2014). Global Capture Production Statistics.  
Girsang, W. (2011). Poverty in Small Islands Maluku (Kemiskinan Multidimensional di Pulau-Pulau 
Kecil Maluku). Ambon: Faculty of Agriculture University of Pattimura Press. 
Grafton, R. Q., Arnason, R., Bjørndal, T., Campbell, D., Campbell, H. F., Clark, C. W., … others. 
(2006). Incentive-based approaches to sustainable fisheries. Canadian Journal of Fisheries and 
Aquatic Sciences, 63(3), 699–710.  
Heazle, M., & Butcher, J. G. (2007). Fisheries depletion and the state in Indonesia: Towards a 
regional regulatory regime. Marine Policy, 31(December 2002), 276–286.  
Homer-Dixon, T. F. (1994). Environmental scarcities and violent conflict: evidence from cases. 
International Security, 19(1), 5–40. 
KIARA. (2012). Laporan Kelautan dan Perikanan: Evaluasi 2011 dan Proyeksi 2012. Jakarta: 
Koalisi Rakyat untuk Keadilan Perikanan. 
Masalu, D. (2000). Coastal and marine resource use conflicts and sustainable development in 
Tanzania. Ocean & Coastal Management, 43, 475–494.  
Muawanah, U., Pomeroy, R. S., & Marlessy, C. (2012). Revisiting Fish Wars: Conflict and 
Collaboration over Fisheries in Indonesia. Coastal Management, 40(3), 279–288.  
Myers, N. (1987). Population, environment, and conflict. Environmental Conservation, 14(1), 15–22.  
Nillesen, E., & Bulte, E. (2014). Natural resources and violent conflict. Annual Review of Resource 
Economics, 6, 69–83.  
North, D. C., Wallis, J. J., & Weingast, B. R. (2009). Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual 
Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History (p. 308). New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Novaczek, I., Sopacua, J., & Harkes, I. (2001). Fisheries management in Central Maluku , Indonesia , 
1997 – 98. Marine Policy, 25, 239–249. 
Pomeroy, R., & Berkes, F. (1997). Two to tango: the role of government in fisheries co-management. 
Marine Policy, 21(5), 465–480.  
Pomeroy, R., Parks, J., Pollnac, R., Campson, T., Genio, E., Marlessy, C., … Thu Hue, N. (2007). 
Fish wars: Conflict and collaboration in fisheries management in Southeast Asia. Marine Policy, 
31(6), 645–656.  
19 
 
Resosudarmo, B. P., Napitupulu, L., & Campbell, D. (2009). Illegal Fishing in the Arafura Sea. In B. 
P. Resosudarmo & F. Jotzo (Eds.), Working With Nature against Poverty Development 
Resources and the Environment in eastern Indonesia (pp. 178–200). Singapore: Institute for 
Southeast Asian Studies. 
Ross, M. L. (2004). What Do We Know about Natural Resources and Civil War? Journal of Peace 
Research, 41(3), 337–356.  
Salayo, N. D., Ahmed M., Garces, L., & Viswanathan, K. (2006). An Overview of Fisheries Conflicts 
in South and Southeast Asia: Recommendations, Challenges and Directions. Naga The 
WorldFish Center Quarterly, 29, 11–20.  
Satria, A., & Matsuda, Y. (2004). Decentralization of fisheries management in Indonesia. Marine 
Policy, 28(5), 437–450.  
Siry, H. Y. (2011). In search of appropriate approaches to coastal zone management in Indonesia. 
Ocean & Coastal Management, 54(6), 469–477.  
Tadjoeddin, M. Z., & Murshed, S. M. (2007). Socio-Economic Determinants of Everyday Violence in 
Indonesia: An Empirical Investigation of Javanese Districts, 1994 2003. Journal of Peace 
Research, 44(6), 689–709.  
Tajima, Y. (2014). The Institutional Origins of Cmmunal Violence: Indonesia’s Transition from 
Authoritarian Rule (p. 224). New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Thorburn, C. C. (2000). Changing Customary Marine Resource Management Practice and Institutions: 
The Case of Sasi Lola in the Kei Islands, Indonesia. World Development, 28(8), 1461–1479.  
Van der Kroef, J. M. (1950). Social Conflict and Minority Aspirations in Indonesia. American Journal 
of Sociology.  
Van Klinken, G. (2007). Communal Violence and Democratization in Indonesia: Small Town Wars (p. 
208). New York: Routledge. 
Varshney, A., Panggabean, R., & Tadjoeddin, M. Z. (2004). Patterns of Collective Violence in 
Indonesia (1990-2003). United Nations Support Facility for Indonesian Recovery (UNSFIR), 
Working Paper 04/03 (p. 45). Jakarta. 
Williams, M. (2007). Enmeshed: Australia and Southeast Asia’s Fisheries (p. 149). New South Wales: 
Lowy Institute for International Policy. 
World Fish Center. (2011). Aquaculture, Fisheries, Poverty and Food Security (p. 60). Penang: The 
World Fish Center. 
Yamamoto, T. (1995). Development of a community-based fishery management system in Japan. 
Marine Resource Economics, 10(1), 21–34.  
 
 
 
  
20 
 
Tables 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Fishing activity  (FA)
Catch per trip (tonnes) 1.486 0.310 2.106 0.011 10.330
Number of days engaged in fishing per week 6.196 6 1.034 1 7
Cost per fishing trip (Rp000000) 0.440 0.170 1.110 0 15.240
Fish within the village sea territory (yes=1, 
no=0)
0.265 0 0.442 0 1
Fishing area changed (yes=1, no=0) 0.457 0 0.499 0 1
Number of years fishing in the village 13.26 10 9.363 0.2 45
Proportion of fishing gears owned 0.517 0.39 0.413 0 1
Fishery condition (FC)
Fish stocks increasing (yes=1, no=0) 0.168 0 0.375 0 1
Fish stocks decreasing (yes=1, no=0) 0.540 1 0.499 0 1
Catch increasing (yes=1, no=0) 0.192 0 0.395 0 1
Catch decreasing (yes=1, no=0) 0.533 1 0.500 0 1
Observed outsiders fishing in the village sea 
territory (yes=1, no=0) 
0.474 0 0.500 0 1
Social relationship (SR)
Relationship with village leader (good=1, not 
good=0)
0.986 1 0.117 0 1
Relationship with fishery department officers 
(good=1, not good=0)
0.639 1 0.481 0 1
Threat to local fishing activity (TF)
Population growth (yes=1, no=0) 0.498 0 0.501 0 1
Deforestation (yes=1, no=0) 0.388 0 0.488 0 1
Aquaculture (yes=1, no=0) 0.467 0 0.500 0 1
Tourism (yes=1, no=0) 0.172 0 0.378 0 1
Demographic (DMO)
Age 38.13 35 12.25 17 80
Number of years of school education 8.488 9 3.015 0 17
Have a second occupation (yes=1, no=0) 0.749 1 0.434 0 1
Number of household members 5.608 5 2.463 0 16
Ethnic group other than Kei and Buton 
(yes=1, no=0) 
0.107 0 0.309 0 1
Dependent variable
Conflict with other marine resource users in 
the village (yes=1, no=0)
0.086 0 0.281 0 1
Conflict with other marine resource users in 
other villages (yes=1, no=0)
0.282 0 0.451 0 1
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Table 2 Regression results: intra-village conflict 
Variable Coefficient
Marginal 
effect Coefficient
Marginal 
effect
Fishing activity  (FA)
Catch per trip (tonnes) 0.052 0.7% 0.267 0.095 0.6% 0.331
Number of days engaged in fishing 
per week
0.018 0.2% 0.924 0.089 0.6% 0.845
Cost per fishing trip (Rp000000) -0.069 -0.9% 0.125 -0.109 -0.7% 0.163
Fish within the village sea territory 
(yes=1, no=0)
-0.036 -0.4% 0.686 -0.149 -1.0% 0.621
Fishing area changed (yes=1, no=0) 0.225 2.8% 0.319 0.379 2.5% 0.316
Number of years fishing in the village -0.018 -0.2% 0.072 * -0.033 -0.2% 0.097 *
Proportion of fishing gears owned -0.300 -3.8% 0.014 ** -0.501 -3.3% 0.025 **
Fishery condition (FC)
Fish stocks decreasing (yes=1, no=0) -0.123 -1.5% 0.030 ** -0.319 -2.1% 0.002 ***
Catch increasing (yes=1, no=0) 0.336 4.7% 0.025 ** 0.645 4.8% 0.057 *
Observed outsiders fishing in the 
village sea territory (yes=1, no=0) 
0.529 6.5% 0.000 *** 1.018 6.5% 0.000 ***
Social relationship (SR)
Relationship with village leader 
(good=1, not good=0)
-0.739 -13.4% 0.000 *** -1.250 -11.8% 0.000 ***
Relationship with fishery department 
officers (good=1, not good=0)
-0.232 -3.0% 0.000 *** -0.507 -3.4% 0.000 ***
Threat to local fishing activity (TF)
Population growth (yes=1, no=0) 0.780 9.5% 0.014 ** 1.517 9.6% 0.004 ***
Deforestation (yes=1, no=0) 0.145 1.8% 0.385 0.272 1.8% 0.419
Aquaculture (yes=1, no=0) 0.249 3.1% 0.466 0.308 2.0% 0.687
Tourism (yes=1, no=0) -0.526 -5.6% 0.007 *** -0.976 -5.5% 0.003 ***
Demographic (DMO)
Age 0.005 0.1% 0.404 0.006 0.0% 0.499
Number of years of school education 0.009 0.1% 0.688 0.022 0.1% 0.708
Have a second occupation (yes=1, 
no=0)
0.342 4.0% 0.145 0.709 4.3% 0.083 *
Number of household members 0.113 1.4% 0.000 *** 0.220 1.4% 0.000 ***
Ethnic group other than Kei and 
Buton (yes=1, no=0) 
0.036 0.5% 0.935 0.208 1.4% 0.829
Constant -2.185 0.005 *** -4.359 0.033 **
Log-likelihood -67.437 -67.565
McFadden's Pseudo-R2 0.209 0.208
Likelihood ratio statstic for the joint 
significance of the model
35.637** 35.381**
Percent predicted correctly 91.41% 91.41%
Number of observations 291 291
Probit Logit
Note: Standard errors are clustered by village. *** 1% level, ** 5% level, and * 10% level. 
p-valuep-value
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Table 3 Regression results: inter-village conflict 
 
 
Variable Coefficient
Marginal 
effect Coefficient
Marginal 
effect
Fishing activity  (FA)
Catch per trip (tonnes) -0.116 -3.1% 0.000 *** -0.205 -3.1% 0.001 ***
Number of days engaged in fishing per week 0.181 4.8% 0.071 * 0.303 4.6% 0.047 **
Cost per fishing trip (Rp000000) 0.087 2.3% 0.004 *** 0.148 2.3% 0.000 ***
Fish within the village sea territory (yes=1, 
no=0)
-0.856 -20.6% 0.000 *** -1.473 -20.3% 0.000 ***
Fishing area changed (yes=1, no=0) 0.541 14.6% 0.000 *** 0.998 15.6% 0.001 ***
Number of years fishing in the village 0.020 0.5% 0.000 *** 0.038 0.6% 0.000 ***
Proportion of fishing gears owned -0.517 -13.6% 0.022 ** -0.906 -13.8% 0.024 **
Fishery condition (FC)
Fish stocks decreasing (yes=1, no=0) 0.200 5.3% 0.002 *** 0.249 3.8% 0.065 *
Catch increasing (yes=1, no=0) -0.840 -19.4% 0.000 *** -1.457 -19.2% 0.000 ***
Observed outsiders fishing in the village sea 
territory (yes=1, no=0) 
-0.176 -4.6% 0.148 -0.330 -5.0% 0.069 *
Social relationship (SR)
Relationship with village leader (good=1, not 
good=0)
0.712 15.4% 0.000 *** 1.172 14.7% 0.001 ***
Relationship with fishery department officers 
(good=1, not good=0)
-0.144 -3.8% 0.729 -0.300 -4.7% 0.698
Threat to local fishing activity (TF)
Population growth (yes=1, no=0) 0.112 3.0% 0.523 0.191 2.9% 0.499
Deforestation (yes=1, no=0) 0.410 11.1% 0.066 * 0.726 11.5% 0.070 *
Aquaculture (yes=1, no=0) 0.293 7.8% 0.358 0.473 7.3% 0.394
Tourism (yes=1, no=0) -0.925 -21.0% 0.231 -1.658 -21.4% 0.288
Demographic (DMO)
Age 0.003 0.1% 0.374 0.005 0.1% 0.078 *
Number of years of school education 0.007 0.2% 0.730 0.023 0.4% 0.539
Have a second occupation (yes=1, no=0) 0.129 3.4% 0.096 * 0.193 2.9% 0.145
Number of household members 0.022 0.6% 0.461 0.043 0.6% 0.425
Ethnic group other than Kei and Buton (yes=1, 
no=0) 
-0.293 -7.3% 0.000 *** -0.473 -6.8% 0.024 **
Constant -2.653 0.007 *** -4.523 0.001 ***
Log-likelihood -135.946 -135.707
McFadden's Pseudo-R2 0.214 0.216
Likelihood ratio statstic for the joint significance 
of the model
74.183*** 74.662***
Percent predicted correctly 75.95% 76.63%
Number of observations 291 291
Probit Logit
Note: Standard errors are clustered by village. *** 1% level, ** 5% level, and * 10% level. 
p-value p-value
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